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Roger J. Miner 
U.S. Circuit Judge 
Evolving Constitutional Concepts of Privacy 
New York Law School 
September 21, 1987 
4:30 P.M. 
Good afternoon, and welcome to our panel discussion on 
"Evolving Constitutional Concepts of Privacy." This program is 
one in a series sponsored by New York Law School in celebration 
of the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution. It seems 
quite fitting that this particular symposium be convened at New 
York Law School, because the most distinguished alumnus of the 
School, Supreme Court Justice John Marshall Harlan, was an 
important contributor to the evolution of a concept of privacy 
embraced in the liberty aspect of the due process clause. 
According to one treatise, "[t]he right to privacy was given 
its first exposition by Justice Harlan in his dissent in Poe v. 
Ullman." In that case, which preceded Griswold v. Connecticut by 
four years and involved the same Connecticut contraceptive 
statute challenged in Griswold, Harlan's dissent included these 
words: "I think the sweep of the Court's decisions, under both 
the fourth and fourteenth amendments, amply shows that the 
Constitution protects the privacy of the home against all 
unreasonable intrusions of whatever character." 
The Poe case is not often referred to because the majority 
found no justiciable issue in view of the fact that there had 
been only one prosecution under the Connecticut statute during 
the past seventy-five years. It was not until later that 
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somebody got himself arrested and the Court was constrained to 
meet the issue head-on in Griswold. Justice Douglas there wrote 
of "emanations" and "penumbras" for the majority; Justice Harlan, 
concurring, adhered to the position he had staked out in the 
earlier case; Justice Goldberg danced around the ninth amendment; 
there were other opinions, concurring and dissenting, and history 
was made. So much for the New York Law School connection. 
It is our purpose to examine, in the course of this 
discussion, the nature, origins, validity and prospects for 
future development of the constitutional right of privacy. To 
that end, there will an an interchange among the panel members 
for an hour or so, and I shall then open the discussion to 
questions and comments from the floor. We anticipate a lively 
debate all around. Now, it is my pleasure to introduce the 
members of the panel: 
John 0. McGinnis is Deputy Assistant Attorney General of the 
United States in the Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel. 
He is a graduate of Harvard Law School, where he was a member of 
the Law Review. He served as a clerk for Judge Kenneth Starr of 
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit, the second most important Circuit Court in the nation. 
He was an associate at Sullivan & Cromwell and an 
attorney-advisor in the Justice Department before his promotion 
to his present position. 
David Chang is a colleague on the New York Law School 
Faculty, where he serves as Associate Professor. He is a 
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graduate of Yale Law School and was an Assistant-in-Instruction 
there. He was a law clerk to United States District Judge W. 
Arthur Garrity of the District of Massachusettts. He teaches 
constitutional law here and has published in several areas, 
including racial discrimination and equal opportunity. 
Norman Dorsen is Stokes Professor of Law at New York 
University Law School, where he has been a faculty member since 
1961. He is a graduate of Harvard Law School and was an editor 
of its Law Review. He served as a clerk in the chambers of 
Justice Harlan in the Supreme Court and has himself argued 
several landmark cases there. He is the author of a number of 
books and articles on constitutional law and civil liberties and, 
since 1976, he has been President of the American Civil Liberties 
Union. 
Harlan L. Dalton has been a member of the faculty of the 
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I am Roger J. Miner, Adjunct Professor of Law, New York Law 
School and also Judge of the United States Court of Appeals, 
Second Circuit, the nation's premier appellate court. I have 
been designated to act as Moderator of this panel. 
Without further ado, we turn to our interesting, provocative 
and controversial topic, "Evolving Constitutional Concepts of 
Privacy." I would like to start out by defining our terms, so to 
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open the discussion I pose this question to each member of the 
panel: "What do you understand the phrase "constitutional right 
of privacy" to mean"? What is your definition of the right, 
Professor Dorsen? 
I. Definition of the Constitutional Right of Privacy. 
(a) Harlan definition -- right that protects "the privacy of 
the home against all unreasonable intrusions of whatever 
charac·ter." 
(b) Right to engage in certain highly personal activites 
relating to reproduction, contraception, abortion and marriage. 
(cl Rights of freedom of choice in marital, sexual and 
reproductive activities. 
(d) Constitutional condemnation of legislation that 
trespasses upon the incidents of marriage, the sanctity of the 
home or the nurture of family life. 
(e) Right that allows the formation and preservation of 
certain kinds of highly personal relationships -- marriage; 
childbirth, raising and education of children, cohabition -- a 
substantial measure of sanctuary from unjustified interference by 
the State. 
(f) Blackmun in Thornburgh dissent refers to decisional and 
spatial aspects of right. 
(g) Brandeis in Olmstead "the right to be let alone." 
II. Sources of the Right. 
(a) Douglas -- Specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights 
have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guaranties; 
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various guarantees create zones of privacy -- 1st, 3rd, 4th, 5th 
or 9th. Griswold "concerns a relationship lying within the zone 
of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional 
guarantees." 
(b) Harlan -- 4th, 14th liberty interests. 
(c) Goldberg -9th amendment -- pre-existed Constitution. 
(d) Associational Liberties. 
(e) Unenumerated rights by marriage. 
(f) NO SOURCE-- pick and choose protected liberty interest. 
III. Protected Areas and Activities. 
1. Marriage 
2. Contraception 
3. Abortion. 
4. Sterilization 
5. Sodomy (homosexual and heterosexual) 
IV. The Basis of Governmental Authority for Interference with 
the Right. 
1. Police power 
2. The right as pre-existing 
3. Residual powers of the states - lOth amendmemt 
V. The Cases 
1. Skinner v. Oklahoma 
2. Griswold v. Connecticut 
3. Eisenstadt v. Baird 
4. Carey v. Population Services 
5. Loving v. Virginia 
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6 . Roe v. Wade 
7. Thornburgh v. American College 
8. Stanley v. Georgia 
VI. Bowen v. Hardwick & Future of Concept. 
1. 5-4 decision 
2. Blackmun dissent refers to right of individual to 
conduct intimate relationships in the intimacy of his or her 
home. 
3. How about application to heterosexuals? 
4. Stevens dissent -- "Liberty" --that animated 
development of law in Griswold "embraces the right to engage in 
nonreproductive, sexual conduct that others may consider 
offensive or immoral." 
Stages of Abortion Decisions. 
Stage I: Roe v. Wade (1973): Right of women to decide whether 
or not to terminate pregnancy. State interest to regulate 
becomes compelling after first trimester. May prohibit abortions 
· ------ ·--onTy-arteCvJ.abTTn:_y-. --Between--endofTrrsE trrmester ··ana-
viability, states may regulate insofar as regulation is related 
to protection of maternal health. No interference by state to 
end of first trimester. 1973-1977 Court struck down series of 
state statutes -- Georgia provision requiring abortions to be 
performed in accredited hospitals; that all abortions be approved 
by Hospital Commission and two doctors. Missouri requirement for 
permission from spouse; Miss. requirement that minors have 
parents' permission. 
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Stage II - 1977 cases -- upheld state medicaid disbursement 
scheme providing for support for childbirth but not for 
non-therapeutic abortions. Upheld St. Louis policy prohibiting 
abortions in city hospitals. 1980 Cases upheld statutes refusing 
financial aid for all abortions, therapeutic and non-therapeutic, 
except as necessary to save life of mother. Relaxed right of 
privacy in face of legitimate state interest in encouraging 
childbirth. 1981 case -- upheld state statute (Utah) requiring 
notification to parents of minor women. Allowed state incursion 
into areas of privacy. 
Stage III - Thornburgh v. American College 
(l) Informed consent provision -- list of specific 
information to be furnished to woman; detrimental physical and 
/ 
psychological effects; probable gestation age and probable 
{ 
\ anatomical characteristics; medical assistance benefits; 
liability of father to assist in support of child; twenty-four 
hour wait before consent. 
(2) Reporting requirements --physician who performs 
abortion after first trimester to report basis for medical 
judgments that child not viable; report available to public with 
detailed information about doctor, facility, age, race, marital 
status, etc. 
(3) Level of care of fetus during aboritons performed after 
viability. Required to use techniques to provide best 
opportunity for unborn child to be aborted alive unless greater 
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risk to life or health of mother. Also, presence of second 
physician required at all abortions where viability is possible. 
Held: Coercive effect. Act tells women that state 
considers abortion immoral. Statute intends restriction on 
access to abortion. Makes physician agent of State. Interferes 
with dialogue between woman and her physician. Possible 
disclosure of identity -- chilling effect. 
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